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In this paper, we examine the empirical implications of reputation formation using a game-
theoretic model of intra-familial interactions. We consider parental reputation in repeated two-stage
games in which daughters’ decision to have a child as a teenager and the willingness of parents to
continue to house and support their daughters given their decisions. Drawing on the work of
Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Kreps and Wilson (1982) on reputation in repeated games, we
show that parents have, under certain conditions, the incentive to penalize teenage (and typically out-
of-wedlock) childbearing of older daughters, in order to get the younger daughters to avoid teenage
childbearing. 
The two key empirical implications of this model is that the likelihood of teenage
childbearing and parental transfers to a daughter who had a teen birth will decrease with the number
of the daughter’s sisters at risk. We test these two implications, using data from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979 Cohort (NLSY79), exploiting the availability of repeated
observations on young women (daughters) and of observations on multiple daughters (sisters)
available in this data. Controlling for daughter- and family-specific fixed effects, we find evidence
of differential parental financial transfer responses to teenage childbearing by the number of the
daughter’s sisters and brothers at risk.
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Teenage childbearing has become an issue of increasing social concern in the U.S. This 
concern has been fueled, in large part, by the fact that such births disproportionately occurred 
out-of-wedlock and by evidence that suggests that early childbearing adversely affects the well-
being of both teen mothers and her children.
1 While there is considerable controversy about the 
causal nature of the relationship between teenage childbearing and well-being and attainment,
2 
there is clear evidence that teenage childbearing is perceived as undesirable by the general public 
and especially by parents. For example, a recent survey found that 95 percent of adults and par-
ents strongly supported the statement that teens should “receive a strong message from society 
that they should abstain from sex at least until they are out of high school.”
3 Other recent studies 
also have found evidence that adults in the U.S increasingly view early childbearing unfavora-
bly.
4 
  Despite these negative views about teenage childbearing, its high rates and the fact that 
most of these births now occur out-of-wedlock suggest that parents may have trouble finding 
ways to translate their attitudes and concerns into actions that reduce early and out-of-wedlock 
births by their daughters. There are many possible reasons for this inability. One set points to 
changes in the social and governmental contexts confronting young women in the U.S. over the 
last several decades that implicitly encourage teen and out-of-wedlock childbearing. These in-
                                                 
1 For example, women who bear children as teenagers are subsequently less likely to complete high school, less 
likely to participate in the labor force, more likely to have low earnings, and less likely to marry than are women 
who do not have children as teenagers. As a result, adolescent mothers, and their children, are likely to spend a sub-
stantial fraction of their lifetimes in poverty (see Upchurch and McCarthy, 1990 and Card, 1981). 
2 The findings of Hotz, McElroy and Sanders (1999), Hotz, Mullin, and Sanders (1997), and Mullin (1998), among 
others, suggest that much of the negative association between teenage childbearing and maternal and child indicators 
of well-being are substantially overstated. 
3 Annie E. Casey Foundation (1999). 
4 See Luker (1996) and Gordon (1997) for evidence on the increasingly negative perceptions of teenage childbearing   2
clude the greater access to contraceptives and abortion in the U.S.
5 and the pro-natalist incentives 
of U.S. welfare programs.
6 Each of these factors may make it harder for parents to “control” the 
childbearing decisions of their daughters. But, it is also possible that there are inherent limita-
tions in the ability of parents to influence the behaviors of their children, even in the absence of 
such contending societal and environmental forces. 
  In this paper we analyze the interactions between parents and their daughters with respect 
to the latter’s teenage childbearing decisions. In particular, we examine whether daughters decide 
to begin their childbearing as teenagers and the ways in which parents attempt to influence, if not 
control, this decision through financial and other forms of support to their daughters. Economic 
models of interactions between parents and their children have their origins in the work of Gary 
Becker. In a seminal result, summarized in his “Rotten Kid Theorem” (1974, 1976, 1991),” 
Becker argued that “altruistic” parents can adjust their transfers to their children to induce, but 
not coerce, them to take actions that maximize the total income of the family, despite these chil-
dren being motivated by their narrow self-interest.
7 That is, the Becker “family,” through its al-
truistic head, is able to internalize all of the potential externalities that the actions of selfish fam-
ily members may have on parents (and other members) and thereby achieve pareto-efficient re-
source allocations. Moreover, the Rotten Kid Theorem implies that altruistic parents do not need 
to resort to strategic behavior—or have external ways to bind them to precommitted responses to 
their children’s actions—in order to achieve such allocations, since neither children nor parents 
                                                                                                                                                             
by segments of the American populace. 
5 See, for example, Akerloff, Yellen and Katz (1996) and Kane and Staiger (1996) for more on the role of abortion 
and contraceptive access and its role in “stimulating” out-of-wedlock and teen births. 
6 See Becker (1996) and Rosenzweig (1998). Moreover, the recently passed Personal Responsibility and Work Op-
portunities Reconciliation Act  (PRWORA), which radically altered the U.S. welfare system, explicitly stated that 
one of the acts objectives was to reduce the rates of early and out-of-wedlock childbearing in the U.S. 
7 Becker (1991), p. 288.   3
can improve upon the transfers that altruistic parents make. 
  However, as noted in several subsequent papers, the Rotten Kid Theorem need not al-
ways hold.
8 For example, the theorem need not hold in multi-period relationships between chil-
dren and parents,
9 when there is asymmetric information between family members,
10 and/or 
when parents and children each have direct preferences over certain goods chosen by the latter. 
A key feature of the latter type of goods—which Becker (1991) calls merit goods—is that par-
ents and children disagree over their value. Bergstrom (1989) proves that the Rotten Kid Theo-
rem requires that the preferences of all family members be members of the class of transferable 
utility functions in order for altruistic parents to rely solely on transfers to achieve efficient intra-
family allocations without precommitment. Under the assumption of normal goods, violation of 
the transferable utility property can result in inefficient allocations and actions by children that 
altruistic parents would not have them choose.
11 
 Bergstrom’s result will come as no surprise to most parents! It formalizes the notion that 
parents may face serious constraints on their ability to control many of the actions their children 
take, especially as those children reach adolescence. At the same time, it also should not be sur-
prising that parents will try to find ways, or strategies, to influence their daughter’s actions when 
faced with these limitations on the influence and control they have over their children, especially 
over actions that are as irreversible as a daughter having a birth as a teen. 
  In what follows, we examine the extent to which altruistic parents, from their point of 
view, are able to reduce, although not eliminate, any inefficiencies with respect to the daughter’s 
                                                 
8 See Lindbeck and Weibull (1988), Bruce and Waldman (1990) and Bergstrom (1989). 
9 See Hirshleifer (1977, 1985), Lindbeck and Weibull (1988), and Bruce and Waldman (1990) for discussions of the 
sorts of inefficiencies that arise when parents and their children engage in repeated interactions.  
10 See Bergstrom (1989). 
11 See also the discussion of this point in the Foreword to the enlarged edition of Becker’s Treatise on the Family.   4
teenage childbearing decisions without explicitly relying on the assumption of transferable utility 
or an exogenously-given means of precommitment. We consider a model in which altruistic par-
ents (or parent) and their selfish teenage daughters play a two-stage game in which daughters de-
cide whether to have an early birth and parents decide whether to respond by withholding re-
sources to them. As implied by Bergstrom (1989), this game does not, in general, result in effi-
cient decisions, at least not when there is “conflict” between daughters and parents over this “ac-
tion,” i.e., the transferable utility condition does not hold. However, parents have an incentive to 
try to establish a reputation for being willing to “punish” older daughters who have teen births in 
order to deter their younger ones from doing the same. We adapt the non-cooperative, game-
theoretic reputation models of Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Kreps and Wilson (1982) to the 
family context. In what follows we adapt a key feature of the Kreps-Wilson and Milgrom-
Roberts models by assuming that older daughters are uncertain about their parents’ true prefer-
ences over their having births as teenagers.
12 
  As we show below, the application of this reputation model of parent-daughter interac-
tions has at least two potentially testable implications for the teenage childbearing decisions of 
daughters and the resources transfers that parents make to them. If parents use their transfers to 
establish a reputation for punishing teen births, the likelihood of teenage childbearing and paren-
tal transfers to daughters who have teen births will both decrease as the number of younger sis-
ters “at risk” for such a birth declines. We examine the empirical validity of these two implica-
tions, using data on the timing of daughters’ first births and the incidence of two alternative 
                                                 
12 We note that recent “collective” models of family decision-making, such as the one in Browning and Chiappori 
(1998), maintain the assumption that members of a family, through “repeated” interactions, come to learn the prefer-
ences of other family members. In our context, the unique and infrequent nature of childbearing actions of daughters 
makes it less obvious that oldest daughters, will know their parents’ true preferences about their having births as 
teens. In the end, the validity of this assumption, through its testable implications about observed behavior, is an 
empirical matter.    5
forms of parental transfers. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we characterize the re-
peated two-stage game of parents and their daughters. We discuss the potential solutions when 
daughters know their parents’ preferences over teenage childbearing and the scope for establish-
ing parental reputation when daughters are uncertain about these preferences. In Section 3, we 
outline a set of “reduced form” empirical implications of our game-theoretic model. Section 4 
outlines the econometric issues that can compromise the testing of these implications, including 
the endogeneity of the teenage childbearing choices of daughters in the econometric specifica-
tions of parental transfer decisions. We exploit the availability of longitudinal data on the trans-
fers parents make to their daughters and the availability of multiple daughters (sisters) for a 
given family in order to implement daughter- and family-specific fixed-effects estimators in our 
analysis. Section 5 provides a more detailed discussion of the data we analyze, namely that from 
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979 Cohort (NLSY79). 
  In Section 6, we present our empirical estimates. We find evidence that daughters with a 
larger number of sisters under age 18, who had a teen birth, are more likely to have support from 
parents withheld than is the case for daughters who have no or fewer sisters under age 18. Such 
findings are consistent with the view that parents are acting strategically to establish reputations 
with respect to their responses to teenage childbearing by older daughters in order to reduce 
teenage births to younger daughters. In the final section of the paper, we offer some concluding 
remarks. 
2.  Game-Theoretic Models of Parent and Daughter Decision-Making  
  In this section we consider the interactions between parents and a daughter with respect 
to the latter’s decision about teenage childbearing and parents’ decision about transfers. We treat   6
parents—be they a mother-father pair or a single parent—as one decision-maker and assume that 
parents are altruistic with respect to their daughters. In contrast, daughters are assumed to be 
selfish, caring only about their own well-being. Parents and daughters care about their own con-
sumption levels and each have preferences over whether the daughter has a child (a grandchild to 
the parents) as a teenager. As noted above, children borne by women who are teenagers typically 
are born out-of-wedlock. Parents and daughters may not have the same “feelings” toward such 
births. Parents, and each of their daughters, are assumed to play a two-stage game. In the first 
stage, a daughter takes an action, b, which is giving, or not giving, birth as a teenager. After ob-
serving the daughter’s b decision, the parents decide whether to provide their daughter with re-
sources, or transfers, t. 
  More precisely, a daughter, denoted by d, cares only about her own consumption, cd, and 
a child borne as a teenager, b. Let the daughter’s utility be denoted by 
 (, ) dd d UU c b  .   (1) 
To account for their own consumption and altruism toward their children, parents are assumed to 
have the following two personalities. The first personality is “consumer-parents,” who derive 
utility from their own consumption and whether they have grandchildren who were born to their 
teenage daughters. The consumer-parents care about their own consumption, cp, and the action, 
b, taken by their daughters, with their utility given by 
  (, ) pp p UU c b  .   (2) 
The second personality of parents is as an altruist, acting as a social planner for the family. This 
is the “planner-parents,” which has a welfare function given by 
  (, ) , (, ) pp p d d WUcb Ucb   .   (3) 
As the planner-parents’ welfare function makes clear, teenage births (b) represent a public good   7
or in Becker’s terminology, a merit good. Parents have an exogenously given income, Ip, to sup-
port their own consumption and that of their daughter, via transfers. Thus, the parent’s budget 
constraint is given by 
  pp Ic t   (4) 
For now, we assume that the daughter has no income of her own; in the empirical analysis we do 
allow for such income and we assume that the daughter is totally dependent on transfers from the 
parents to support her consumption, cd.
13 That is, the daughter’s budget constraint is given by  
  d ct = . (5) 
  The two-stage game that parents and each daughter play can be described as follows:  
Stage 1: In  daughter’s decision about teenage childbearing, her problem is to 
   max ( ( ), ) d
b
Ut bb , (6) 
 where  t = t(b) is the parent’s best response function from Stage 2. 
Stage 2:   In planner-parents’ decision about transfers, their problem is to 
   m a x  [ ( ,) , ( ,) ] pp p d
t
WU I t bU t b  , (7) 























Finally, we assume, from the planner-parents’ standpoint, that both the consumer-parents’ and 
daughter’s utility are normal goods and that Wp has nice concavity to guarantee a unique solution 
to this game. 
  To fix ideas and examine alternative solutions to this parent-daughter game, we assume 
that the preferences of the players are restricted as follows. First, we assume that all planner-
                                                 
13 For now, we assume that there is no consumption on the part of grandchildren. Below, we consider the implica-
tions of allowing the actions of daughters to entail a “cost” to their, and possibly their parents’, consumption.   8
parents disapprove of teenage childbearing, regardless of whether they make transfers or not. 
Thus, 
  All Parents:  (,0 ) (,1 ) pp Wt b Wt b   
    (8) 
for all t, where  1 2 12 12 ( , ) [ ( , ), ( , )] pp p p d Wt vb v WUI vv Uvv     and where we let b ∈ {1,0}, 
where b = 1 denotes that a daughter had a teen birth and b = 0 that she did not, and t ∈ {1,0}, 
where t = 1 denotes the parents making a transfer to their daughter and t = 0 that they do not. 
  With respect to the degree of parental altruism, we assume that there two types of par-
ents. One type, “forgiving” parents, have strong altruistic feelings toward their daughters, rela-
tive to their dislike of teen childbearing. Such parents will not, ex post, withhold transfers if their 
daughter has a teen birth, even though they do not like this behavior. That is, the forgiving par-
ents’ preferences satisfy the following ordering: 
  Forgiving Parents:  (1 , 1 ) (0 , 1 ) pp Wt b Wt b  
  . (9) 
Alternatively, some parents, the “unforgiving” ones, are less altruistic. Such planner-parents are 
not willing to forgive their daughter’s transgressions and would prefer to punish daughters who 
have teen births. In this case, 
  Unforgiving Parents:  (1 , 1 ) (0 , 1 ) pp Wt b Wt b    . (10) 
With respect to the preference orderings of daughters over teenage childbearing (b) and own 
consumption (cd), we assume that daughters prefer parental transfers and teen births to no trans-
fers and no teen births. More completely, we assume the following structure on each daughter’s 
preferences, 
  Daughters: ( 1 ;1 ) ( 1 ;0 ) (0 ;1 ) (0 ;0 ) d ddd Ut b Ut b Ut b Ut b   
  
  
  , (11) 
where the particular ordering over the middle two bundles is less crucial than the ordering of the 
outer two.   9
  We next characterize alternative solutions to this game depending on whether or not 
daughters know their parents’ preferences. 
2.1  Parent-Daughter Games under Perfect and Complete Information 
  As a first case, we assume that both players in the game, i.e., the daughter and the par-
ents, have perfect and complete information about each other’s preferences. For now, we assume 
that the game is played once between the parents and each of their daughters. We define efficient 
allocations for parents and their daughter as those that the planner-parents would make if they 
chose both b and t to maximize Wp. As noted in the Introduction, if the utility functions of all 
players, Up and Ud, are conditionally transferable, the planner-parents always can devise a trans-
fer such that daughter takes into account the full consequences that having a teen birth has on her 
consumer-parents. That is, Becker’s Rotten Kid Theorem holds if and only if the preference or-
derings of parents and their daughters are transferable.
14 Without this assumption, the allocations 
achieved in the above game between daughters and their parents need not be efficient. This is 
because the daughter may not take account of all the “externalities” that her teenage childbearing 
choice imposes on her parents. As a result, the daughter will tend to over- or under-consume 
teenage childbearing, depending on the functional forms of Up and Ud, in the above game.  
  Consider, for example, the decision-trees for the daughter-parent game given in Figure 
1,
15 where we assign numerical values to the various payoffs for forgiving and unforgiving par-
ents, respectively. As noted above, the daughter moves first, deciding whether to have a teen 
birth. If she does not (the “No Teen Birth” action), we assume that her parents will respond by 
providing her with a transfer. If she does (the “Teen Birth” action), her parents have a choice as 
                                                 
14 Bergstrom (1989) proves that transferable utility is a necessary and sufficient condition for the Rotten Kid Theo-
rem to hold. 
15 Each daughter participates only once in the game, according to birth order.   10
to how to respond. Depending on their preferences, parents will either provide a transfer and ac-
quiesce to the daughter’s action by not punishing her (“Parents Acquiesce”) or they will withhold 
their support and punish her (“Parents Punish”).
16 Given the assigned payoffs, the socially opti-
mal action is for the daughter not to have a child as a teen, i.e., b = 0, for either type of parents. 
With no teen birth, the planner-parents reach their highest utility (Wp = 1), but the daughter ob-
tains a utility level (Ud = 1) that is less than she would be able to get in case of “Teen Birth, Par-
ents Acquiesce” (Ud = 2). 
  The actual solution will vary, depending on the parents’ type of preferences. If the par-
ents of the forgiving type, they get Wp(t = 1, b = 1) = 0.5 by acquiescing and Wp(t = 0, b = 1) = -1 
by punishing their daughter if she has a teen birth. In this case, the forgiving parents are better 
off acquiescing. Knowing that the forgiving parents always acquiesce to a teen birth, the daugh-
ter obtains Ud = 2 by “Teen Birth” and Ud = 1 by “No Teen Birth.” Therefore, the best choice for 
daughter is a “Teen Birth.” Thus, the unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is “Teen Birth, 
Parents Acquiesce.”
17 In equilibrium, their daughters manipulate forgiving parents to accept a 
sub-optimal action. In this case, the equilibrium allocation does not correspond to the social op-
timum. If, in contrast, the parents are unforgiving, [Wp(t = 0, b = 1) = -1 > Wp(t = 1, b = 1) = -2] 
and daughters, knowing this about their preferences and, thus, how parents will react to a teen 
birth, will choose not to have such a birth, i.e., [Ud (t = 0, b = 1) = -1 < Ud(t = 1, b = 0)  = 1]. 
Thus, the only Nash equilibrium is the “No Teen Birth, Parents Punish” one in which case the 
equilibrium is socially optimal.  
                                                 
16 Since the younger daughters observe the exact payoffs (Wp) of the parent in earlier periods of the game, the “for-
giving” parents must hold the same level of payoffs as the “unforgiving” parents if they decide to punish older 
daughters’ teen births. Otherwise, the payoffs reveal the parents’ type immediately. 
17 The “No Teen Birth, Parent Punishes” outcome is also a Nash equilibrium, but is not credible and violates the ra-
tionality of sub-game backward induction.   11
2.2  Parents Establishing a Reputation: A Finitely Repeated Game with One-Sided 
Uncertainty about Preferences 
  We now turn to the case where daughters do not know their parents’ preferences with 
certainty. This uncertainty about preferences gives rise to the potential for parents to make stra-
tegic use of their transfers to daughters in an attempt to obtain greater “conformity” of their 
daughters’ actions with their own preferences over teenage childbearing. That is, we examine the 
possibility that altruistic parents treat their daughters differently by birth order in order to estab-
lish a credible “reputation” for punishing teen childbearing.
18 Our analysis is an application of 
the repeated-games, reputation model developed by Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Kreps and 
Wilson (1982). These authors consider the problem of a monopolist, the “incumbent firm,” that 
prefers to avoid rival firms entering their industry in order to maintain their monopoly rents. In 
their model, fighting off such entry attempts, by setting prices at levels below costs, will result in 
temporary losses to the incumbent firm. But, by establishing a credible reputation of fighting en-
try, such temporary losses may be compensated by the gains from forestalling future entrants 
without having to resort to price cutting actions. A key assumption of their model is that poten-
tial entrants are uncertain about the exact nature of the incumbent firm’s payoff functions, i.e., its 
cost structure.  
  Adapting the Milgrom-Roberts and Kreps-Wilson asymmetric information assumptions 
to the family context,
19 parents are assumed to have complete information about the preferences 
of all of their daughters. In contrast, daughters, at least those in the early rounds (i.e., older 
                                                 
18 Note that the model outlined below can also accommodate the case where parents would prefer their daughters to 
bear children earlier than the daughters prefer. Such a case may be relevant to those parents who lament their fact 
that their daughters have not provided them with grandchildren! 
19 The informational structure of the game can take several forms. In the Milgrom-Roberts extended model, there is 
a continuum of parent types and daughters do not ever know the parent’s payoffs. In contrast, in the Kreps-Wilson 
two-type two-player two-action model, the parent’s payoff history is observable to all daughters, Despite different 
model structures, both specifications yield similar conclusions with respect to reputation effects. As noted in the   12
daughters), are assumed not to know whether their parents are forgiving or unforgiving types 
with perfect certainty. The oldest daughters may have some initial, or prior, beliefs about the 
parents’ type, which may be formed from previous interactions with her parents as she (and her 
sisters) grow up, from her knowledge of her parents’ background, or from observing the re-
sponses to teenage childbearing of other families in her family’s neighborhood or social class.
20 
But, we assume that the priors that the oldest daughter forms about her parents’ preference order-
ings over teenage childbearing are not degenerate. That is, we assume that it is impossible for the 
oldest daughter (and maybe some or all of her remaining sisters) to discern exactly how her par-
ents will feel about and react to her having a teen birth solely from past interactions with her par-
ents and from the interactions of other families. Finally, we do assume that younger daughters 
can observe the childbearing outcomes and the parental transfer responses for all of their older 
sisters. Thus, we do not rule out the possibility that younger daughters, who play in later rounds 
of this family game, can acquire information about parental preferences toward teen childbear-
ing. 
  More precisely, assume that there are N daughters in a family in which each daughter’s 
teenage childbearing decision represents one round of a repeated game played with parents.
21 
The order of the rounds is from the oldest (N) to the youngest (1) daughter. The planner-parents 
maximize the (discounted) sum of the welfare associated with each round. For now, we assume 
that parents do not discount the utility of future relative to current rounds of the game. Below, we 
                                                                                                                                                             
text, we follow the specification used in the Kreps-Wilson version of the model.  
20 See Nechyba (1999) for a model of social approval of illegitimate childbearing and its potential role in explaining 
the causal relationship between out-of-wedlock childbearing and the pro-natalist incentives of the AFDC system.  
21 For simplicity, we ignore the possibility that each daughter may engage in teenage childbearing more than once. 
More generally speaking, if the reputation theory applies to a class of bad behavior, round of game does not depend 
on children’s birth order, but also rely on all types of child behaviors that parents would like to influence via reputa-
tion.    13
discuss the robustness of our findings to discounting. 
  The case of interest is whether forgiving parents, who knows that their daughters are un-
certain about their actual type, will have an incentive to mimic the unforgiving type so as to es-
tablish a reputation for “being tough.” Most of the discussion that follows is based on this par-
ticular case. But, before turning to that case, consider the situation facing families with only one 
daughter, i.e., N = 1. In this situation, even if the daughter is uncertain about the parent-type, it is 
optimal for parents to follow the static equilibrium strategy and there is no role for establishing a 
reputation. That is, forgiving parents always will acquiesce if their only daughter has a teen birth 
while unforgiving parents always punish such an action. Given her prior belief that her parents 
are forgiving types, an only daughter will choose b to maximize her expected payoffs. She will 
have a birth as a teen only if she is confident enough about the likelihood of having forgiving 
parents, i.e. that the daughter’s prior beliefs that her parents are the forgiving type exceeds some 
threshold. 
  We now turn to the case of N-daughter families, where N > 1. A daughter is labeled as the 
k
th daughter if she has k-1 younger sisters. (So the oldest daughter is daughter N and the youngest 
is daughter 1.) Let πk denote the daughter k’s belief, or probability, of having forgiving parents 
before she chooses her action, b. Thus, the prior belief of the oldest daughter is πN and, as the 
game moves on, this belief is updated to πN-1, πN-2, …, π1. Define a sequence of belief thresholds 
  k  , where 
   1
(1 , 0 ) (0 , 1 )
(1 , 1 ) (0 , 1 )
dd
dd
Ut b Ut b







  1 1( 1 )
k
k    . (13)   14
The numerator in (12) represents the maximum cost of teenage childbearing while the denomina-
tor denotes the benefits of giving a birth as a teenager and obtaining parental support. Therefore, 
1   represents the “cost-benefit” ratio that makes a daughter indifferent between having or not 
having a teen birth. If the daughter believes her parents’ preferences are more lenient than  1  , 
the “benefits” of having a birth overweigh the “costs” and she chooses to have a teen birth. As 
one moves up the birth order, from the youngest to the oldest, it follows that there is more 
reputation gain for the forgiving parents to punish teenage childbearing. As a result, older 
daughters must have strong beliefs that their parents are forgiving types in order to choose to 
have a teen birth, which implies that  k   increases with k. 
  Following Kreps and Wilson (1982) and assuming that parents are sufficiently patient, 
the sequential equilibrium for the N-daughter family can be described in three regimes. Suppose 
the prior of the oldest daughter, πN, falls between  * k   and  *1 . k  +  Define Regime 1 as all daugh-
ters who are older than daughter k*, i.e., k > k*. Parents, with probability one, will punish all the 
k
th daughters, k > k*, that have a teen birth. Because all daughters in the family know this pun-
ishment policy, the k
th daughter (k > k*) will try to avoid having a teen birth. Furthermore, be-
cause parents always punish during Regime 1, the daughters’ prior about their parents’ type re-
mains equal to πN until k = k*. After k*, parents adopt a randomized strategy for determining 
what their transfer outcome, i.e., punishment strategy, will be. In particular, parents choose to 
punish the k

















.   (14) 
Let n* represent the first round (daughter) in which parents acquiesce to teen childbearing by 
that daughter, where k* > n*. On the n*
th daughter, the parents reveal their type to be “forgiv-  15
ing.” Define the interval k* > k ≥ n* as Regime 2 and k < n* as Regime 3. In Regime 2, although 
parents employ a randomized punishment strategy, although the actual observed parental trans-
fers in this regime are all t = 1. Mimicking the parents’ randomized transfer strategy, daughters 
in Regime 2 follow a randomized strategy with respect to having births as teens. In particular, the 
k
th daughter (k* > k ≥ n*) will no longer try to avoid a teen birth with probability one. Rather she 
will try to avoid it with probability greater than or equal to  1. kk    Finally in Regime 3, the 
parent’s type is no longer uncertain and the equilibrium reduces to the static game equilibrium, 
i.e., the “Teen Birth, Parents Acquiesce” outcome, for the k
th daughters, where k < n*. 
  Figure 2 displays the three-regime solution to the daughters-parent, repeated game with 
reputation effects. Strictly speaking, the model implies that the transfer and birth outcomes in 
Regimes 1 and 3 are deterministic. In Regime 1, parents will punish all teen births and, as a re-
sult, daughters in this regime would never choose to have a teen birth. In Regime 3, no teen 
births will be penalized so the theory implies that all younger daughters will choose to have one 
with certainty. It is more realistic to assume that teen births in these two regimes are stochastic, 
conditional on the intentions and birth control actions taken by a daughter. In contrast, the 
daughter’s and the parents’ strategies in Regime 2 depend on the previous daughter’s childbear-
ing outcome and the parents’ transfer response to that outcome. That is, there is a truly sequential 
nature to choices that parents and daughters make in the second regime and to the actual round of 
the game (the particular daughter) at which the family moves from Regime 2 to Regime 3. 
  There are several caveats and extensions to the reputation model as applied to the family 
context. The first concerns the role of discounting of the future by parents. In the above model 
we assumed that parents did not discount the impacts of future rounds of the game, i.e., we im-
plicitly assumed that their discount factor, δp, was equal to 1. In fact, the three-regime equilib-  16
rium described above only holds when δp equals or is sufficiently close to 1. Kreps and Wilson 
(1982) show that as this discount factor becomes sufficiently small, only Regime 3 exists in the 
equilibrium. In this case, forgiving parents have much less of an incentive to establish a reputa-
tion for punishing the teenage childbearing of any of their daughters, since the discounted bene-
fits of obtaining greater conformity by their younger daughters in the future is likely to be ex-
ceeded by the costs of punishing their older daughters. In the empirical analysis presented below, 
we propose a way of detecting the impacts of such discounting of future payoffs by parents. 
  Second, the general implications of reputation theory outlined above can be extended to 
other juvenile or undesirable behavior and the corresponding parental responses. If, for example, 
parents have common views, or preferences, over a class of behaviors, then parental responses to 
one behavior will be informative signals about other behaviors. For example, although we focus 
on teenage childbearing is this paper, punishing daughters’ childbearing may signal parent’s 
general attitudes toward other undesirable behaviors, such as dropping out of school, crimes, il-
legal drug use, alcohol and smoking addictions. 
  Finally, the simple reputation model outlined above focused on the impact of parental 
reputation effects on daughters. Parents also might be concerned the decisions that their sons 
make about fathering children as teens or other behaviors they want them to avoid. As such, par-
ents, in their responses to the childbearing decisions of their older daughters, may seek to estab-
lish reputations to influence their younger sons as well as their younger daughters.
22 Thus, we 
might expect parental transfer responses to teen childbearing to depend on both the number of 
younger daughters and the number of younger sons. We investigate this possibility in the empiri-
cal work below. 
                                                 
22 We note that the literature on the effects of teenage childbearing has devoted much less attention to the conse-
quences for fathers. One exception is the work by Brien and Willis (1997).   17
3.  Testable Implications of Reputation Models on Teenage Childbearing and Parental 
Transfers 
  The reputation game between parents and their daughters implies several potentially test-
able implications with respect to the teenage childbearing of daughters and the parents’ transfer 
behavior conditional on a daughter’s birth choice. We now characterize these decisions rules and 
discuss these testable implications. 
 Let 
n npa b ′  denote the 0/1 indicator for whether the n
th daughter in the p
th family has a teen 
birth when the parents are age  n a′ 23 and  np t τ  denote the 0/1 indicator for whether the p
th parents 
provide a transfer to the daughter at parents’ age τ. (In the empirical analysis presented below, 
we classify births occurring before a daughter is age 18 as a teen birth and consider transfers to 
the daughter when she is age 18 and older.) Let Gb(⋅) denote the index function for this daugh-
ter’s teenage childbearing decision, Gb(⋅) ≥ 0 implies 
n npa b ′  = 1. The reputation model implies that 
Gb(⋅) can be represented as follows in its most general form 
  ()
*
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p n
nn n n n n n n
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b pa p np pa a pi i a npa a npi i a npa Gn k I E I I E I π ′ ′ ′′′ ′ ′ ′ =+ =+Ω  (15) 
where  ,
n pa n ￿  
*, p k  and πnp are defined in the previous section; 





ap i i a EI =+ ￿￿  is the expected future income stream of the parents, where the expectation is taken 
at  n a′  and is conditioned on the n
th daughter’s information as of  n a′  and where Ap is the parents’ 
age of death; 
n npa I ′  is the n




a npi i a EI =+ ￿￿  her expected future income 
stream, where An is the age of the n
th daughter’s death (measured in terms of parental age); and 
n npa￿   denotes the n
th daughter’s information set as of  , n a′  which contains past realizations of bjpτ, 
                                                 
23 Throughout this section, we index the ages of daughters in terms of parental age.   18
tjpτ, Ipτ and Ijτ for j = n+1,….,N and τ = 0,…,, n a′  the parents’ rate of time preference, δp, and 
tastes parameters, ωjp, for daughters j = n,…,N. With respect to transfer decisions, let Gt(⋅) denote 
the index function for this daughter’s teenage childbearing decision, Gt(⋅) ≥ 0 implies  np t τ  = 1. It 
follows from the theory that Gt(⋅) can be represented as 
   
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p n A A
t n p p p n p p p p ii n p n p ii p Gb n k N I E I I E I tt t t t t t t t  =+ =+  , (16) 
where Np is the total number of daughters (or sons and daughters) and  , pt   the p
th parents’ in-
formation set as of τ contains  npt   plus the taste parameters, ωjp, for the remaining daughters, j = 
1,…,n, and the parents’ taste parameter, φp. 
  There are a number of predictions with respect to how parental transfers and the n
th 
daughter’s teenage childbearing decisions vary with the birth order of the daughter, the past pa-
rental choices and the choices of older daughters as well as the parental response to the n
th 
daughter’s teenage childbearing choice. Unfortunately, the data used in this study—the 
NLSY79—does not contain sufficient information on the past choices made within each family 
to allow us to test the full range of these predictions. Therefore, we test a more limited, or “re-
duced form,” set of predictions from the reputation model in this paper. To derive such predic-
tions, we need to express the decision rules in (15) and (16) in terms of family-specific initial 
conditions and exogenous time-varying characteristics and eliminate their dependence on the 
teenage childbearing choices of older daughters and the past transfer choices of parents. To ac-
complish this, note that past choices by parents and daughters enter the decision rules in (15) and 
(16) through the updated beliefs about the preferences of parents, i.e., through πnp.  In particular, 
the reputation model implies that πn can be represented as follows:   19
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24 (17) 
Using (15) and (16) to recursively substitute for past values of 
n npa b ′  and  , np t τ  it follows that πnp 
can be expressed as a function of lagged parental income, daughter’s income and the tastes the 
parents and the daughters, i.e., 
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Substituting the expression in (18) for πnp in both (15) and (16), Gb
 and Gt can be rewritten as: 
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  The reputation model’s most robust, and testable, predictions concern how parents’ and 
daughters’ decisions vary with the birth order of the parents’ children. Consider the parents’ de-
cision to make transfers to a daughter, conditional on her teenage childbearing choice. Under the 
conditions described in Section 2.2, the game-theoretic model implies that parents have an in-
centive, regardless of their type, to establish a reputation for being unforgiving by treating the 
behavior of older daughters differently than their younger sisters are treated. If so, the incidence 
and amounts of parental transfers to daughters who have teen births should be lower for older 
daughters, relative to younger ones, all other things being equal. That is, 
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. (21) 
As noted in Section 2.2, establishing such a reputation for being unforgiving will not be optimal 
(or credible) if either (a) the preferences of parents and their daughters are transferable or (b) 
                                                 
24 Note that the π’s are assumed to be a function of the tastes of all of the daughters (or children) in the family.   20
daughters are not uncertain about the parents’ preference type, in which case the effect of the 
number of remaining children on  np t τ  should be zero. 
  The reputational incentives of the model also imply birth order effects with respect to the 
teenage childbearing decisions of daughters. Older daughters, uncertain as to their parents’ type, 
will try to avoid having teenage births but this incentive to avoid teen births will be lower for 
younger daughters in the family. Alternatively stated, the model implies that 
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As with parental transfer decisions, if either condition (a) or (b) noted above apply, parents have 
no incentive to establish reputations for being unforgiving and, thus, 
n npa b ′  should not vary with 
,
n pa n ￿  all else equal. Note that the reputation effects described in (21) and (22) are established 
holding past, current and expected future parental and daughters’ incomes constant. Failure to do 
so would confound any reputation effect of the number of younger daughters remaining at risk to 
have a teen birth with the effects of life cycle changes in parental income. In particular, to the ex-
tent that the income of parents rise as they get older, younger daughters with teen births could re-
ceive greater transfers simply because their parents are wealthier for these daughters than they 
were when their older daughters were making decisions about teen births. In the next section, we 
discuss how we deal with life cycle changes in parental wealth and the potential for dealing with 
its potentially confounding influence when estimating reputation effects. 
  The model also implies that the parents’ incentive to establish a reputation for punishing 
teen births—and, thus, the effect of birth order on the teenage childbearing decisions of their 
daughters—will vary with parents’ rate of time preference. In particular, the more impatient are 
parents, the less likely they are to respond by withholding transfers after a teen birth and, as such,   21
the less likely daughters are to avoid teen births as a function of the number of younger sisters 
they have. That is,  
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We consider the predictions in (24) and (23) to be more tenuous than (22) and (21), since the na-
ture of the equilibrium in reputation games is less clear cut as δp deviates from 1. Moreover, test-
ing this implication is compromised by the lack of direct measures of parental rates of time pref-
erence. Nonetheless, we examine these latter two predictions in the empirical analysis presented 
below by examining how birth order effects on teenage childbearing and parental transfer re-
sponses vary with the gap in ages between a daughter and her next oldest sister (or brother). 
4.  Econometric Specification Issues 
  To test the validity of the above implications of the reputation model of parent-daughter 
interactions, we need to formulate estimable versions of (19) and (20). To proceed, we need to be 
more explicit about the nature of the processes generating the income of parents and daughters 
over their respective life cycles. This is necessary for two reasons. First, the data we use does not 
contain complete histories of parental income (or, in some cases, of the incomes of all daugh-
ters). Thus, we cannot condition directly on these variables in (19) or (20). Second, we need to 
account for the forecasting of the future levels of incomes of parents and daughters in (19) and 
(20). To address both, we make several simplifying assumptions about the nature of the proc-
esses generating Ipτ and Inpτ, respectively. We continue to assume that both sources of income are 
exogenously given vis-à-vis birth and transfer decisions. Furthermore, we assume that they can   22
be represented as follows:  
  (, ) pp p p p Ih tt   	
 
 x , (25) 
  (, ) np np np np np Ih tt  	 	
 
 x , (26) 
respectively, where h(⋅) is a function of age, τi, a vector of person-specific observable character-
istics, xi, i = p, np, and a permanent-transitory stochastic structure, where ψp and κnp are the per-
manent components and εpτ and νnpτ are the transitory components, and we assume that ψp and 
κnp are uncorrelated with εpτ and νnpτ and εpτ and νnpτ are serially uncorrelated. 
  It follows from (25) and (26) that all forecasts of future incomes of the parents depend 
only on τp, xp, and ψp and those for the income of daughters on τnp, xnp, and κnp, while past reali-
zations of income are functions of τi, xi (i = p, np), ψp, κnp, εpτ and νnpτ. Furthermore, it follows 
from the discussion in Section 2 that the threshold birth order that determines Regime 1, 
*
p k , also 
can be expressed as a function of these same error components, as well as πNp. Exploiting these 
implications and approximating (19) and (20) as linear functions of the set of conditioning vari-
ables, we use the following representations of the decision rules for  np t τ  and 
n npa b ′  in our empiri-
cal analyses: 
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where 
n npa AG ￿  denotes the age-gap between the n
th daughter and her next older sister who is un-
der the age of 18,  Np    is an error-ridden measure of πNp, ∆πNp is its measurement error (i.e., πNp 
=   Np    + ∆πNp), and where the α’s, θ’s, γ’s, β’s, ζ’s, and η’s are unknown parameters. The hy-
pothesized reputation effects are characterized by the parameters α6 and β1 for the parental trans-
fer and daughter teen birth decisions, respectively, and the coefficients on the interactions with 
the age-gap variable, α7 and β5, capture the reputation model’s potential implications for how 
behavior may vary the more impatient are parents. We also augment the specifications in (27) 
and (27) by including a corresponding set of variables and interactions that measure the number 
of remaining brothers under age 18 (and the age-gap between a daughter and her next oldest 
brother under age 18) to assess the potential importance of parents establishing a reputation for 
being “tough” with their sons. 
  One could proceed by estimating the parameters in (27) and (28) using least squares 
methods, where the last two lines in each of these expressions are treated as composite error 
terms, denoted, say, by 
t
np u t  in (27) and 
n
b
npa u ￿  in (28). But the orthogonality conditions for 
t




npa u ￿  with the observable determinants in (27) and (28) that are required for least squares are 
unlikely to hold for several reasons. First, the model of parent-daughter interactions implies that 
the n
th daughter’s teen birth decision,  ,
n npa b ′  is influenced, in part, by the same unobserved com-
ponents of daughters’ preferences and those generating parental and daughters’ income that di-
rectly enter the parental transfer equation through 
t
np u t . Thus,  ,
n npa b ′  in (27) cannot be uncorre-
lated with  .
t
np u t  Furthermore, to the extent that parental tastes for teenage childbearing, φp, are 
correlated with unobserved parental tastes for their own fertility, both 
t
np u t  and 
n
b
npa u ￿  would be   24
correlated with the parents own fertility variables—i.e., Np, AGnpτ, and, as a result, npτ—that en-
ter both (27) and (28). As such, estimation of the effects of these variables, and their interactions, 
also would be subject to endogeneity bias when using least squares methods. 
  In order to deal with these potential sources of endogeneity bias, we exploit two features 
of the NLSY79 to devise more robust estimators for the parameters in (27) and (28). The 
NLSY79 provide observations on daughters at different ages and data on multiple daughters of 
the same parents. These data allow us to implement two alternative “fixed-effects” estimation 
strategies. In the first, we exploit the multiple-sister data to devise “family-level fixed-effects” 
estimators of the parameters in (28) and (27). As discussed in Section 2, the reputation theory 
predicts that parents should punish, with probability one, their daughters who have teen births 
until the number of remaining sisters is less than or equal to the threshold, 
*, p k  that defines the 
rounds of the game in Regime 1. That theory also indicates that 
*
p k  depends on family-specific 
characteristics, including  0 p   , ∆πNp, φp, ψp, δp, and the ωnp’s and κnp’s for all daughters in the 
family. Therefore, the family fixed-effect estimator eliminates the influence of these family-
specific components, be they observable or unobservable in both (28) and (27). Moreover, the 
family fixed-effect estimator eliminates the impact of all the transitory income shocks that are 
realized before the oldest daughter (e.g., the d
th daughter) in the family that is observed in the 
data makes her teen childbearing decision, i.e., it eliminates the εpi’s and νjpi’s, for i ≤  d a  and j = 
d,…,N, in both (28) and (27). We present results for family fixed-effects estimators of the pa-
rameters for (28) and (27) below.
25 Note that the coefficients on npτ (and its interactions) in (27) 
and (28), when controlling for family fixed-effects, are identified by the within-family temporal 
                                                 
25 Below, we do report least squares estimates for the parameters in (27), largely for purposes of comparison with 
the family fixed-effect estimates.    25
variation in this variable. This variation can come from either the birth of new daughters or the 
aging of daughters out of adolescence and into adulthood. In our context, almost all of the identi-
fication comes form the latter source of variation. 
  Using family fixed-effect estimators, however, does not account for time-varying unob-
servable factors that differ across sisters (daughters) in the same family. For example, family 
fixed-effects estimators do not account for differences across the information sets of two (or 
more) sisters at the time of their respective teen birth decisions. To account for between-sister 
differences, we also employ a “daughter-specific fixed-effects” estimator, exploiting the longitu-
dinal data on each daughter in the same family. This second type of fixed-effects estimator ac-
counts for the influence of family- and daughter-specific time-invariant unobservables. Daugh-
ter-specific fixed effects estimators also control for any information available up to the time 
when each daughter in a family makes her teen birth decision, i.e., at age  n a for the n
th daughter. 
This information includes all family-specific characteristics through age  n a that would be elimi-
nated by the family-specific fixed-effects estimator. As a result, the daughter-specific fixed-
effects estimator accounts for the endogeneity of the n
th daughter’s teen birth outcome,  ,
n npa b ￿  in 
the parental transfer equation given in (27). Because of this latter property, the individual fixed-
effects estimator is, a priori, our preferred estimator.
26 Note, however, we can only employ the 
latter type of fixed-effect estimator when estimating the parental transfer equation; we cannot 
implement such an estimator for the parameters in (28) because there are no repeated observa-
tions on teen birth for a given daughter.
27 
                                                 
26 The work of Hotz, McElroy and Sanders (1999) on the effects of teenage childbearing suggests instrumental vari-
ables (IV) estimator for (27) in which whether or not a woman experiences a miscarriage as a teen is used as an in-
strument for the teen childbearing variable, bnpτ.  
27 As with the family fixed-effects estimator, temporal variation in npτ, due to daughters aging out of adolescence, 
identifies the coefficients on this variable (and its interactions) in (27) and (28).   26
  While the use of fixed-effects estimators—especially the daughter-specific fixed-effects 
variety—deal with all of the sources of bias that could arise in the specifications of the teen birth 
and parental transfer decisions given in (28) and (27), they may not be robust to certain generali-
zations of the specifications for these decision rules. For example, suppose that we allowed the 
tastes of parents (and daughters) to evolve over time (i.e., parents could learn about how they 
feel about their daughters having teen births) or that the time-varying stochastic components in 
(25) and (26) are serially correlated. With respect to tastes, it is possible that parental tastes with 
respect to the teenage childbearing of their daughters evolve over time, as parents gain experi-
ence with consequences of such births form their experiences with their older daughters. Simi-
larly, a number of studies suggest that a permanent-transitory error structure is inadequate for 
characterizing the labor market earnings processes of individuals.
28 Under either of these gener-
alizations, our estimates of reputation effects derived for either set of fixed-effect estimators 
might still be biased. In an attempt to minimize these potential sources of bias, we control for an 
extensive set of observable time-varying parental and daughter-specific characteristics when es-
timating (28) and (27). For example, we include parental age, as of the time period when a par-
ticular daughter makes her teenage childbearing decision and/or when the parents are making a 
decision about transfers to a particular daughter, in both equations in order to proxy for the influ-
ence of time-varying factors determining parental income and/or the evolution of parental tastes. 
We also include daughter’s age and other time-varying daughter-specific characteristics in our 
specifications of (28) and (27). 
  While failure to account for the above sorts of time-varying unobservables may bias our 
estimates of reputation effects, we note that such bias may be contrary to the implications of the 
                                                 
28 See, for example, Lillard and Willis (1978) and Abowd and Card (1989), and Hirano (1998).    27
reputation model. Consider the following potential source of such bias. Suppose that we fail to 
capture changes in parental or daughters’ incomes over time due to unexpected changes of wel-
fare policies, such as changes in AFDC benefits. If these policy changes provide greater benefits 
to those who have teen births and/or the amount of such benefits increases with the number of 
children under age 18, our estimates of estimates α2 and α6 in the parental transfer equation, for 
example, will capture both the effects of parental reputation and the impact of variation in wel-
fare policies. To the extent that welfare programs like AFDC provide higher benefits for bigger 
families, we should observe more parental transfers to daughters who have teen births amongst 
families that have more daughters (or children) under age 18. Note that the bias imparted due to 
the latter effect is in exactly the opposite direction as the predicted effect of the number remain-
ing daughters (or children) implied by our theory of parental reputation. As a result, the failure to 
adequately account for the impact of time-varying changes in welfare policy should lead to an 
under-estimate of the parental reputation effect. 
5.  The Data  
  This study uses data from the 1979 to 1994 waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth 1979 (NLSY79). The NLSY79 consists of a nationally representative sample of youth in 
the U.S. between the ages of 14 to 21 in 1979.
29 As noted above, we focus our analysis on the 
subset of the female respondents in the NLSY79 who have at least one sister in the sample. The 
NLSY79 sample design selected all children between the ages 14 and 21 (by January 1, 1979) 
who resided in surveyed households that were drawn in 1978. Of the 5,827 civilian female re-
spondents originally included in the NLSY79,
30 1,697 had one or more sisters in the NLSY79, 
                                                 
29 For a complete description of this survey, see Bureau of Labor Statistics (1999). 
30 The NLSY79 also included a supplementary sample of women who were in the military at the time the sample 
was drawn. None of the women in this supplementary sample had sisters in the study.    28
representing 782 families. Below, we discuss how this “multiple-sisters” sample we use in our 
empirical analyses differs from the sample of all NLSY79 female respondents. 
  The NLSY79 Survey gathered an extensive set of data on its female respondents in its 
1979 baseline interview and in subsequent annual interviews through 1994. Included in this data 
are detailed fertility histories of female respondents as well as information about two forms of 
parental transfers to be described below. We also make use of the rich set of personal and family 
background characteristics gathered in the NLSY79 annual surveys. 
The teen birth indicator, bnp, used in the estimation of (28) and (27), is defined to be equal 
to 1 if a particular NLSY79 respondent (daughter) had a live birth prior to age 18. Based on this 
definition, we estimated the specification in (28) using one observation per daughter and measur-
ing the time-varying variables, npτ, AGnpτ, and xpτ, at age τ, where this age is determined accord-
ing to the age of first birth for daughters who had a teen birth or age 17 for daughters who did 
not have a birth prior to age 18. 
To assess the implications of the above reputation model, we analyze two alternative 
measures of parental transfers, tnpτ. The first is a dichotomous variable indicating whether a 
daughter’s parents provided her with at least 50 percent of her annual expenses when she was 
age t, for t > 18. We refer to this as the indicator of parental “financial transfers.” 
We used a dichotomous variable indicating whether the daughter was living in her par-
ents’ home in at a given age as a second measure of parental transfers, tnpτ. We refer to this as the 
parental “co-residence transfer.” We note that the cash-equivalent of living with one’s parents is 
not inconsequential as it entails free or low-cost room and board as well as the potential for free 
child care assistance for daughters who have births. Furthermore, among adult daughters who re-
ceive parental aid—particularly those who are poor or single mothers—the incidence of those re-  29
ceiving such a co-residence transfer is much greater than that of receiving financial transfers 
from parents (see Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1994; Hao and Brinton, 1997). At the same time, liv-
ing with one’s parents also entails less privacy and freedom and may involve non-financial obli-
gations, such as providing assistance with household chores. Thus, it is not completely clear how 
daughters will value such residential transfers from parents and, as a consequence, how much 
“leverage” parents have through the provision and withholding of it from their daughters. 
Variables key to the tests of the reputation effects—the number of sisters (brothers) under 
age 18, age gap between the daughter and the oldest sister (brother) in the risk set, and the 
daughter’s prior belief about parents—are described in detail in Appendix A. The other variables 
used in the empirical specifications of (28) and (27) to control for differences in the family back-
grounds, preferences of daughters and parents, and the context in which families make their deci-
sions are described in Appendix A. 
As noted above, we restrict our analyses to NLSY79 female respondents who had at least 
one other sister in the survey. Compared to the population of all parents, this multiple-daughter 
subsample over-represents daughters from large families. To examine how this subsample differs 
from the general population of families, we present, in Appendix B, means and standard devia-
tions for the variables used in our financial transfer analyses for the multiple-daughter and all-
family samples. Beyond the anticipated differences in the average number of children and num-
ber of sisters (brothers) under age 18 noted above, the averages of the characteristics for the mul-
tiple-daughter subsample looks similar to those for the full sample of daughters. Parents in the 
multiple-daughter subsample are slightly wealthier, more educated, and more likely to be blacks 
than is the case for the families in the all-daughter sample. Moreover, parents in the multiple-
daughter sample are more likely to provide financial transfers to their daughters than is the case   30
in the all-daughter sample. Thus, while the generalizability of the results presented below is lim-
ited to the behavior of multiple-daughter families, it is not apparent that this sample is particu-
larly selective on other family characteristics. 
6. Results 
  Before turning to our multivariate analysis, we examine the simple associations between 
our endogenous variables and number of sisters at risk (under age 18). Tables 1.1, 1.2, and 2 
provide data on these associations for parental transfers and teenage childbearing, respectively. 
Throughout our empirical analysis, we present separate estimates by race of those relationships 
that are relevant to assessing the validity of our theory. We do so because there are marked dif-
ferences in teenage childbearing rates between blacks and non-blacks and because previous eth-
nographic and sociological studies have found evidence to suggest that there are differences by 
race in the acceptance of teenage childbearing. 
  Table 1.1 and 1.2 present sample proportions by the teenage childbearing status of daugh-
ters and by the number of sisters under age 18 for parental financial and co-residence transfers. 
As one can see, on average, parents provide lower levels of financial transfers to daughters who 
become teen mothers than to daughters who do not have teen births. For example, among all 
races, 11% of daughters who are teen mothers receive financial transfers from parents, at ages 
older than 18, while the corresponding figure is 22% for daughters who do not have a teen birth. 
Thus, the average parental “punishment” for teen childbearing is a decline in the likelihood of 
getting financial help from parents of .11 (0.11 – 0.22). As can be seen in Table 1.2, parents also 
penalize daughters who have teen births by lowering the likelihood of providing housing to their 
daughters (.20 for daughters who have teen births versus .26 for daughters who do not) but the 
penalty is less.    31
  Note that the implication we draw from the reputation model of daughter-parent interac-
tions over teenage childbearing concerns how these punishments change with the number of sis-
ters at risk. How these punishments change with number of sisters under the age of 18 are dis-
played at the bottom of Tables 1.1 and 1.2. (See the entries under the “(1) Minus (2)” headings in 
both tables.) We do find that this penalty for teen childbearing does increase with the number of 
sisters under age 18 for both financial and residential transfers. For example, going from 0 to 1 
sister under 18 increases the teen childbearing penalty from –0.10 to –0.19 on average, from -.07 
to -.17 for blacks, and from –0.08 to –0.15 for non-blacks. The one exception is for residential 
transfers for non-blacks in Table 1.2, where there is a positive difference (0.28) for those daugh-
ters who have 3 or more sisters under 18. The latter may be due to the very small number of cell 
count, where there are only 5 daughters who had a teen birth in this three and more sisters cate-
gory.)  
  The patterns shown at the bottom of both of these two tables are consistent with the pre-
dictions of the parental reputation model. However, they also are consistent with the fact that pa-
rental income may rise over the life cycle that could account for the greater likelihood of a trans-
fer to younger daughters who have teen births. To better assess the validity of the reputation 
model’s predictions, we need to examine the results that employ the econometric methods out-
lined in Section 4 that attempt to control for these alternative explanations. 
  Table 2 presents the sample proportions of teenage childbearing among daughters by the 
number of sisters under age 18 in the family. The data in Table 2 is not consistent with the pre-
dictions of the reputation model developed in Section 2.2. The incidence of teenage childbearing 
is substantially higher for women with at least three younger sisters compared to those with zero 
to two younger sisters, although there is much less difference across the zero, one and two cate-  32
gories. The breakdowns by race show a similar pattern for blacks, even though the incidence of 
teenage childbearing are much higher. For non-blacks, we see a monotonic decline from zero to 
two sisters under age 18 but the trend reverses from two to three or more sisters under age 18. 
Thus, the extent to which the reputation story is relevant for teenage childbearing behavior, it 
must depend on our ability to control for the sorts of differences across families noted in our dis-
cussion of the econometric specification in Section 3. 
  Turning to the multivariate analysis, we present OLS and fixed-effects estimates in Ta-
bles 3, 4 and 5 for the parental financial and co-residence transfers decisions, and the teenage 
childbearing decisions, respectively. We present OLS estimates along with the fixed-effects es-
timators to provide a benchmark for what accounting for family- and individual-level sources of 
heterogeneity do to our estimates. In each of these tables, we provide only those parameter esti-
mates (and marginal effects based on parameter estimates) most relevant for the reputation 
model or the alternative explanations noted above.
31 All of the estimates were derived using the 
multiple-daughter sample described in Section 4. 
  Table 3 presents a selected set of estimates from the econometric specification in (27) for 
parental transfer decisions using the provision of financial transfers as our outcome measure. We 
present estimates for three different types of econometric estimators—OLS, family fixed-effects 
and individual fixed-effects estimators—using the multiple-daughter sample. Table 3 also pre-
sents results from three incremental models. Panel A serves as a baseline, where the reputation 
effect (captured by the number of sisters under 18) and the discount factor (captured by the age-
gap between the daughter and her oldest sisters under age 18) are tested. Panel B examines the 
additional reputation effect by using the number of brothers under age 18 and attempts to disen-
                                                 
31 A full set of estimates is available from the authors upon request.   33
tangle the parental reputation effect from the influence of life cycle increases in parental income 
by including a measure of parental income and the age of the parents at the time of the transfer 
decision. Panel C examines the robustness of reputation effect by controlling for the number of 
sisters under age 18 who have had a teen birth. 
According to our game theoretic model, parents’ incentives to establish reputation imply 
that daughters who had a teen birth and have a large number of sisters remaining at risk are more 
likely to be punished. In other words, the greater the number of sisters under the age of 18, the 
less likely is a daughter with a teen birth to receive financial transfers from parents. To test this 
hypothesis, we examine the coefficient on the interaction term between teenage childbearing and 
the number of sisters under age 18 (bnp⋅nnpτ) in Table 3. A consistent set of findings about the 
reputation effect emerges across the three estimators, throughout the three panels, and for blacks 
and non-blacks. In particular, we find that the coefficient on this interaction term is negative and 
that it tends to be statistically different from zero with high levels of precision. Note, too that 
while the estimated effect is larger, in absolute value, as one moves from OLS to the individual 
fixed-effects estimators, these changes are not sizeable. We also note that the estimated effect is 
not substantially different from that found in Table 1.1. Thus, based on this finding, there ap-
pears to be strong evidence of parental financial transfer responses to teenage childbearing that 
are consistent with the prediction regarding sisters remaining at risk suggested by the reputation 
model developed in Section 2.2. 
  How does parents’ discounting of the future weaken the parental reputation effect? We 
examine the coefficient on the interaction term between teen birth, the number of sisters under 18 
and the sister age gap (bnp⋅nnpτ⋅AGnpτ). Results from OLS throughout the three panels show a sig-
nificant discounting effect; the discount is about 10% of the reputation effect. As one moves   34
from OLS to family fixed-effects and individual fixed-effects estimators, the sign of the estimate 
remains positive and its magnitude remains similar but the estimate becomes less precise. This 
finding implies that the discount factor (δp) is close to one and parents’ discounting of the future 
plays a minor role in their reputation building and disciplining their children remaining at risk. 
  Our theoretical prediction about parents’ reputation concerns not only the undesirable be-
havior under investigation (teenage childbearing) but also other risky, undesirable behaviors. 
Parents punish teenage childbearing in order to prevent undesirable behaviors from occurring to 
at-risk younger children, girls and boys. To test this possibility, we include the number of broth-
ers under 18 and its relevant interaction terms in Panel B. The estimate of this added reputation 
effect (captured by the interaction between teen birth and the number of brothers under 18) is 
negative and significant for both blacks and non-blacks in all three estimators. The effect is of 
the similar size as that found in the sister measure. This is evident that parents’ motivation to 
build reputation and to discipline children is broad covering an array of undesirable behaviors 
rather than narrow with a specific undesirable behavior. The discount factor in terms of the 
brother measure is not significantly different from one. 
  Panel B also tests the possibility that the reputation effect might be biased by the failure 
to account for life cycle increases in parental income. As already noted, increases in parental in-
come over their life cycle would lead to an estimated effect of number of remaining sisters that is 
of the same sign as the effect implied by our parental reputation model. To help separate the lat-
ter life cycle income effect from the reputation effect, we include in Panel B an interaction term 
between teen birth, the number of siblings under 18 and family income (and all relevant lower-
order interaction terms). If the estimate of the effect of number of remaining siblings is picking 
up, in part, the impact of life cycle increases in parental income, we should expect to find a sig-  35
nificant, positive coefficient on this interaction term. The coefficient on this interaction is insig-
nificant and close to zero, providing a stronger test of the parental reputation effect by disentan-
gling it from the influence of life cycle increases in parental income. 
  In Panel C we went further along the line of specific undesirable behavior in parents’ mo-
tivation of reputation building. We have been measuring “at risk” by the number of sisters 
(brother) under 18, the age range of minor children under the ward of parents. If the reputation is 
specific to teenage childbearing, we should disregard those sisters who have had a teen birth. 
Thus we add a parallel set of variables using the number of sisters under 18 with a teen birth. If 
the motivation for specific behavior (teenage childbearing) is right, we should see a significant, 
positive coefficient on the interaction between teen birth and the number of sisters under 18 with 
a teen birth. Instead, we see a negative coefficient. It is insignificant for blacks but significant 
and sizable for non-blacks. Two implications are possible. First, it further suggests the broad-
oriented motivation of reputation building by parents for both blacks and non-blacks. Second it 
implies that non-black parents are more alert to multiple incidences of teenage childbearing and 
act harsher than black parents. 
Our analysis from Panel A to Panel C provides three pieces of strong evidence to support 
our game theoretic prediction about parental reputation effects. First the reputation effect is sig-
nificant and sizable for both blacks and non-blacks. Second, the reputation effect is broadly-
oriented rather than specifically-oriented, as exhibited in both the number of sisters and brothers 
remaining at risk and the lack of sensitivity to the number of sisters under age 18 with a teen 
birth. Third, the reputation effect remains strong and significant when we include our measure of 
parental income with the number of sisters under age 18. 
  We perform a parallel set of analyses using parental co-residence transfers as the out-  36
come. The corresponding estimates are presented in Table 4, with the format being the same as 
that in Table 3. Comparing the results in Tables 3 and 4, we find several similarities and differ-
ences. The similar patters include (1) the persistent negative sign of the reputation effect, cap-
tured by the interaction between teen birth and the number of sisters (brothers) under 18; (2) the 
estimated effect of the number of remaining sisters under age 18 does not seem to be the result of 
increases in parental income as parents get older; and (3) the parental reputation effect is not sen-
sitive to the number of sisters under 18 with a teen birth. However, we find a few noticeable dif-
ferences. First, the coefficient on the interaction between teen birth and the number of sisters un-
der 18 tends to be weaker and less stable than that on financial transfers. Second, for financial 
transfers, we find a similar and significant reputation effect for non-blacks and blacks. But for 
co-residence transfers, the reputation effect captured by the interaction between teen birth and 
the number of sisters under 18 in Panel A is stronger and more significant for non-blacks than for 
blacks. Third, whereas the discounting effect is close to one in the financial transfer equation, the 
discounting effect has a wrong sign, albeit insignificant, in the co-residence transfer equation. 
Overall, the estimated parental reputation effect on co-residence transfers shows less consistency 
with the reputation model with less precision than the estimated reputation effect on financial 
transfers. As we discussed in Section 2, co-residence transfers are complicated by the potential 
parent-child conflict and a loss of privacy, our reputation model does not fully take into account 
this more complicated process than in the case of financial transfers. 
Finally, we turn to the results for a daughter’s teenage childbearing decision, presented in 
Table 5. As before, we present both OLS and fixed-effects estimates (with only family fixed-
effects estimates since we have only one observation for each daughter’s teenage childbearing 
behavior). Panel A testes the parental reputation effect by the number of sisters (brothers) under   37
18 and Panel B tests the sensitivity to the number of sisters under 18 with a teen birth. The pri-
mary implication from our reputation model is that the greater the number of sisters (brothers) 
under 18, the less likely a daughter will have a teen birth. Overall, the results are quite unstable. 
For example, in Panel A, the results from the OLS estimator and the family fixed-effects estima-
tor yield the same negative sign for the number of sisters under 18 with low precision. This lack 
of significance of the reputation effect may reflect the lack of statistical power to detect the effect 
due to the relatively smaller number of observations as compared to the transfer analysis. The 
reputation effect captured by the number of brothers under 18 has an opposite sign to our expec-
tation and significant for blacks. We suspect that this effect may be attributable to the distinctive 
relationship between parents and sons for blacks. 
More noticeably, the parental reputation effect is not sensitive to the number of sisters 
under 18 with a teen birth in the OLS estimator but very sensitive in the family fixed-effects es-
timator (see Panel B). Based on the reputation model, forgiving parents are likely to punish these 
sisters with a teen birth right away by withholding transfers or other disciplinary measures in or-
der to send a strong signal to their other at-risk daughters that teen childbearing is unacceptable. 
While we do not have data on how parents immediately react to teen births, our results from the 
analysis on financial transfers during adult years suggest that such punishment may have oc-
curred. Thus, we would expect that, when daughters make decisions on teenage childbearing, 
experiencing the reaction of their parents to the incidence of teen births of their sisters would re-
duce the probability of teenage childbearing. According to the fixed-effects estimate in Panel B, 
it appears that, for both blacks and non-blacks, the incidence of teenage childbearing having al-
ready occurred to sisters serves as a strong signal from the parents that such behavior is very 
wrong. Such a signaling effect is so strong that it overshadows the parental reputation effect.   38
7. Conclusions 
  In this paper, we have examined the empirical implications of parental reputation forma-
tion in a game-theoretic model of interactions between parents and their daughters over the teen-
age childbearing decisions of daughters and the transfer responses of parents to those decisions. 
Our investigation focuses on a circumstance where the family fails to act as a unitary actor. We 
recognize that the family internalizes parental values and norms through socialization, supervises 
children’s behavior through positive and negative sanctioning, and internalizes externalities 
through unitary decision-making. However, children’s undesirable behavior, such as teenage 
childbearing, occurs and parents have incentives to establish reputation in order to prevent such 
undesirable behavior from occurring to their younger children. Our paper addresses the parent-
daughter interactions under this circumstance. Drawing on the theory of reputation in repeated 
games by Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Kreps and Wilson (1982), we show that parents have, 
under certain conditions, the incentive to penalize teenage (and typically out-of-wedlock) child-
bearing of older daughters, in order to get the younger daughters to avoid teenage childbearing, 
or to get the younger children to avoid undesirable behavior in general. While such differential 
treatment does not result in pareto-efficient decision-making by the family, the use of reputation 
by parents may improve upon an altruistic-headed family’s allocations of resources and child be-
havioral outcomes. 
  The two key empirical implications of our game theoretic model is that the likelihood of 
teenage childbearing and parental transfers to daughters who have had teen births will decrease 
with the number of sisters (brothers) under 18. In the paper, we tested these two implications, us-
ing data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979 Cohort (NLSY79). We exploited 
the availability of repeated observations on young women (daughters) and of observations on   39
multiple daughters (sisters) available in the NLSY79 to use family and individual fixed-effects 
estimators in order to control for the possibility of endogeneity and omitted variable bias when 
conducting tests for the parental reputation effect. Based on these methods, we find strong evi-
dence of parental financial transfer responses to teenage childbearing by the number of sisters 
(brothers) under 18 for both blacks and non-blacks. Moreover, these estimated effects do not 
seem to be explained by the fact parents have higher incomes when their younger daughters be-
come of age to have teen births due to life cycle changes in parental income. Rather, our findings 
appear to be quite consistent with the implications of parents establishing reputations for being 
unforgiving of daughters bearing children as teens. While the findings for co-residence transfers 
and teenage childbearing decisions are weaker, they suggest the mechanism of parents’ reputa-
tion formation. Further testing, which examines other risky teenage behaviors and exploits more 
of the structure of the game-theoretic model motivating this work, will be the focus of future 
work.   40
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Panel 1: Daughters’ Prior Belief of the Probability of Having a Forgiving     
Parent (πN) and the Definition of k* 
Panel 2: Forgiving Parent’s Transfer Strategy, t(b),  by the Number of 
Remaining Daughters in the Game (n)  
Panel 3: Teenage Childbearing Strategy of Daughters, by the 
  Number of Remaining Daughters in the Game (n) 
1
n 
Prob (Teen Birth) 
1- ρ 
Regime 1  Regime 2  Regime 3 
N (oldest)    ….          k*+1     k*     k*-1  k*-2            ……            n*        ……                 1(youngest) 
Choice conditioned on 
fact that previous daugh-
ter, who had teen birth, 
was punished. 
n 
Prob (No Transfer) 
 
Regime 1  Regime 2  Regime 3 
N (oldest)    ….          k*+1     k*     k*-1  k*-2            ……            n*        ……                 1(youngest) 
Actual t depends on history. 
Equilibrium shown here is 
conditional on the previous 
daughter being punished. 
Figure 2: Features of the Solution to the Daughters-Parent Repeated Game  
with Reputation Effects   45
 
Table 1.1: Parental Financial Transfers by Teenage Childbearing, Race, and 
Number of Younger Daughters Under 18 
 
Conditions Total Black Non-Black 
 Mean  N  Mean  N  Mean  N 
Teenage Childbearing Status            
  No teenage childbearing  0.22  12,200  0.20  3,217  0.23  8,983 
  Had teenage childbearing  0.11  1,418  0.10  848  0.13  570 
Total  0.22 13,618 0.18  4,065 0.22  9,553 
           
(1) Teenage Childbearing             
  Number of sisters under 18             
  0    0.09
  861    0.08  582    0.11  279 
  1    0.15  211    0.12  151    0.20  60 
  2    0.16  110    0.20  61    0.12  49 
  3+    0.31  42    0.18  37    0.92  5 
  Missing  0.07  194  0.05  17  0.07  177 
           
(2) No Teenage Childbearing             
  Number of sisters under 18             
  0    0.18  7,568    0.15  2,029    0.19  5,539 
  1    0.34  2,094    0.29  720    0.35  1,374 
  2    0.41  569    0.43  150    0.41  419 
  3+    0.56  117    0.56  38    0.56  79 
  Missing  0.21  1,852  0.19  280  0.21  1,572 
           
(1) Minus (2)             
  Number of sisters under 18             
  0   -0.10
123     -0.07
123   -0.08
23   
  1  -0.19
0   -0.17
03   -0.15
3   
  2  -0.25
0   -0.23
0   -0.29
03   
  3+  -0.25
0   -0.38
01      0.36
012   
Notes:  Sampling weights were used to reproduce the population distribution of means and standard deviations.  
 The  superscript  “numbers” on the table entries denote which differences in means by number of younger daughters 
under 18 are significantly different at the .10 level. For example, a code of “03” beside -0.29 indicates that this 
mean is significantly different from the means for 0 remaining sister and 3 remaining daughters. 
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Table 1.2: Parental Co-Residence Transfers by Teenage Childbearing, Race, and 
Number of Younger Daughters Under 18 
 
Conditions Total Black Non-black 
 Mean  N  Mean  N  Mean  N 
Teenage Childbearing Status            
  No teenage childbearing  0.26  19,747  0.35  5,289  0.25  14,458 
  Had teenage childbearing  0.20  2,343  0.26  1,425  0.14  918 
Total    0.26  22,090    0.33  6,714    0.25  15,376 
           
(1) Teenage Childbearing             
  Number of sisters under 18             
  0    0.19
  1,535    0.24  1,022    0.13  513 
  1    0.36  252    0.42  177    0.25  75 
  2    0.22  126    0.27  73    0.16  53 
  3+    0.45  45    0.35  40    0.92  5 
  Missing  0.11  385    0.13  113    0.09  272 
           
(2) No Teenage Childbearing             
  Number of sisters under 18             
  0    0.24  13,250    0.32  3,611    0.22  9,639 
  1    0.44  2,380    0.49  795    0.43  1,585 
  2    0.57  586    0.61  154    0.56  432 
  3+    0.69  118    0.88  38    0.64  80 
  Missing    0.20  3,413    0.25  691    0.19  2,722 
           
(1) Minus (2)             
  Number of sisters under 18             
  0   -0.05
23     -0.08
23   -0.09
2   
  1  -0.08
2   -0.07
23   -0.18
2   
  2  -0.35
01   -0.34
01   -0.40
013   
  3+  -0.24
0   -0.53
01      0.28
2   
Notes:   Sampling weights were used to reproduce the population distribution of means and standard deviations.  
   The  superscript  “numbers” on the table entries denote which differences in means by number of younger 
daughters under 18 are significantly different at the .10 level. For example, a code of “23” beside -0.06 indi-
cates that this mean is significantly different from the means for 2 remaining sister and 3 remaining daughters. 





Table 2: Teenage Childbearing by Race, and Younger Daughters Under 18 
 
Conditions Total Black Non-Black 
 Mean  N  Mean  N  Mean  N 
Number of sisters under 18             
  0  0.07  393  0.17  113  0.05  280 
  1  0.07  560  0.22  179  0.04  381 
  2  0.06  288  0.23  99  0.02  189 
  3+  0.11  53  0.26  62  0.06  91 
Missing 0.04  295  0.05  51  0.04  244 
Total 0.07  1,689  0.20  504  0.04  1,185 
Note:     The sample consists of daughters from multiple biological daughter families in the NLSY79. Sampling 
weights were used to reproduce the population distribution of means and standard deviations.   48
Table 3: Determinants of Parental Financial Transfers 
[Dependent Variable: Whether Daughter Received Financial Transfer from Parents at Age t;  
Sample: Families with 2-4 Daughters; Data Source: NLSY79] 
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Panel B:     
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Table 3: Determinants of Parental Financial Transfers (Continued) 
 




Panel C:     


















































































































No. of Family or Individual Fixed Effects    755  1,652 
No. of Observations  13,618  13,618  13,618 
Notes:  Financial transfer = 1 if parents provide at least half of living expenses, = 0 otherwise. In addition to variables listed above, 
OLS regressions control for family characteristics, such as parental age, family income in 1978, welfare status, parental edu-
cation, parental attitude towards teen sex and total family size; daughter’s characteristics, such as age, race, AFQT and other 
test scores; and contextual variables, such as living in central city, black and poverty proportion in the resident county, state 
AFDC benefits level and county employment growth rate. The fixed-effect regressions also control for such as parents’ age, 
daughter’s age, and time-varying contextual variables.  
  The highlighted areas display various marginal effects of the number of remaining daughters (or sons) on parental transfers. 
 
 *  p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01   50
Table 4: Determinants of Parental Co-Residence Transfers 
[Dependent Variable: Whether Daughter lived with Parents at Age t;  
Sample: Families with 2-4 Daughters; Data Source: NLSY79] 
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Table 4: Determinants of Parental Co-Residence Transfers (Continued) 
 




Panel C:     


















































































































No. of Family or Individual Fixed Effects    758  1,659 
No. of Observations  22,090  22,090  22,090 
Notes:  Coresidence = 1 if the respondent lives with parents, = 0 otherwise. In addition to variables listed above, OLS regressions 
control for family characteristics, such as parental age, family income in 1978, welfare status, parental education, parental at-
titude towards teen sex and total family size; daughter’s characteristics, such as age, race, AFQT and other test scores; and 
contextual variables, such as living in central city, black and poverty proportion in the resident county, state AFDC benefits 
level and county employment growth rate. The fixed-effect regressions also control for such as parents’ age, daughter’s age, 
and time-varying contextual variables.  
  The highlighted areas display various marginal effects of the number of remaining daughters (or sons) on parental transfers. 
 
 *  p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
   52
Table 5: Determinants of Teenage Childbearing of Daughters 
[Dependent Variable: Birth Prior to Age 18; Sample: Families with 2-4 Daughters;  
Data Source: NLSY79] 
Variables OLS  Family 
Fixed-Effects 
Panel A    




































Panel B    
















































No. of Family Fixed Effects    782 
No. of Individuals  1,697 1,697 
   53
Table 5: Determinants of Teenage Childbearing of Daughters (continued) 
 
Notes:   Both models include year and age dummy variables. The family fixed effects estimator excludes two 
daughters who belong to the same family but differ in race. 
Both regressions also include the following control variables: Whether at least one biology sister is in-
terviewed, biological parent’s age, missing indicator for biological parent’s age, mother’s education, 
missing indicator for mother’s education, father’s education, missing indicator for father’s education, pa-
rental family income in 1000’s of 1978 dollars, missing indicator for parental family income, whether 
daughter was in an intact family at age 14, whether parents received AFDC in 1978, missing indicator 
for AFDC receipt, total number of siblings in daughter’s family, total number of daughters in household, 
black dummy, AFQT score, missing indicator for AFQT score, measures of locus of control and self-
esteem, whether living in central city, proportion of population black in county of residence, proportion 
of households living in poverty in county of residence, poverty Central city interaction, AFDC benefit 
level (in $1000) in state of residence, manufacturing employment growth rate in county of residence. 
The highlighted areas display various marginal effects of the number of remaining daughters (or sons) on 
the incidence of teenage childbearing. 
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
   54
Appendix A 
Definitions of Variables used in Estimation of Teen Birth and Parental Transfer Equation 
Estimation 
 
  In this Appendix, we describe how the explanatory variables used in the specifications of 
of (28) and (27). (The dependent variables for these equations are described in the text.) 
Numbers of Sisters and Brothers Under 18:  
  Using the information contained in the questions on siblings of the NLSY79 respondents, 
which were gathered in a special module in the 1993 interview, we constructed variables for the 
number of sisters and brothers under age 18 at each age of the female respondent in question. 
These variables are age-variant; the two sources of variation are aging out (22%) and new-born 
siblings (0.6%).  We also constructed variables for the number of sisters under 18 who had had a 
teen birth. To allow for differences in the effects by race, separate sets of variables are con-
structed for blacks and non-blacks, where non-blacks include whites and Hispanics. 
Age-Gap Variables:  
  As noted in Section 2.2, we use the gap in ages between the d
th daughter and her oldest 
sister (brother) under 18. Again, we construct these age-gap variables from the sibling questions 
implemented in the 1993 NLSY79 interview. The age-gap variables are measured by the year 
difference between the respondent and her oldest sister or brother who is under age 18, where if 
the oldest sibling under 18 is older than the respondent, we truncate the age-gap to 0.  If respon-
dent is the only child in the family or if no more siblings are under age 18, the age-gap variable 
is set to zero. Separate variables were constructed for blacks and non-blacks. 
Measures of Prior Beliefs about Parents (πNp): 
  The other game theoretic predictor is daughters’ prior belief about parents’ type. In order 
to describe daughters’ prior belief of parents’ preference, we rely on information on attitudes to-
ward teenage sex (a proxy of teenage childbearing) that were gathered in the General Social Sur-
vey (GSS). For the available 1,685 individuals born between 1929 and 1944 (drawn from GSS 
1986-1992), we calculate the group means of attitudes toward teen sex by race, ethnicity, educa-
tion, gender, and regional residence and then impute the value for NLSY79 women’s parents us-
ing the group means. The original question is a 4-point scale (0-3) with the highest being the 
most liberal. The average scale for the socio-economic-regional groups is .79 to .1.29. We as-
sume that our respondents observed the attitudes of other parents who resembled their own par-
ents and formed the prior belief of their own parents’ preference. 
Family Background and Daughter-Specific Characteristics and Contextual Variables: 
  We have three blocks of control variables—family characteristics, individual characteris-
tics and contextual conditions. Among the family characteristics, two variables are important 
controls for interpreting the estimated effect of the number of sisters (brothers) under 18, and the 
interaction of this variable with teen births, as reputation effects. First, we have the total number 
of children in the family at each age of the daughter to separate out the resource dilution effect   55
from the reputation effect. Parents’ financial resources may spread thin across a large number of 
children, compounding the parental reputation effects of a large number of sisters under age 18. 
Second, we use parents’ age to separate out the parents’ life course effect from the reputation ef-
fect. When parents reach midlife and the peak of their earning profile, they have more resources 
to transfer to a daughter who had a teen birth. This may be particularly true for daughters who 
have fewer siblings under age 18 (implying also a smaller number of sisters under age 18). The 
set of variables describing parents’ characteristics captures their preferences or tastes. Included 
in this set are the following variables: parents’ education, family income, family structure and 
welfare receipt. The set of daughters’ individual characteristics includes her age, race, ability, 
and psychological states, which influence both daughters and parents’ decision. Finally, the set 
of variables describing the community conditions captures the economic and social environment 
within which the daughter and the parents make decisions. These include whether lived in central 
city; proportion of population in county of residence that are black, proportion of population in 
county of residence that live in poverty, and AFDC guarantee levels and employment growth 
rates in state of residence.   56
Appendix B: Comparison of Descriptive Statistics for Full Sample and Sister Sample: 
Variables Used in Financial Transfer Analysis 
 
  Full Sample  Sister Sample 
Variable  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Dependent  Variable      
  Parental financial transfers  .18 .39 .22 .41 
Variables used in Tests of Reputation Effects      
  Parents’ attitudes toward teen sex  .41 .20 .42 .20 
  Missing information on siblings  .11 .31 .08 .27 
  Number of sisters under 18  .22 .54 .28 .59 
  Number of brothers under 18  .23 .56 .25 .56 
  Age-gap between daughter and her oldest sister under 18  1.36 3.46 1.61 3.60 
  Age-gap between daughter and her oldest brother under 18  1.43 3.50 1.65 3.74 
  Number of sisters under 18 already had a teen birth  .02 .17 .02 .16 
Family Characteristics      
  Parent’s age  50.94 12.12 51.56  7.41 
  Missing parent’s age  .03 .18 .00 .06 
  Mother’s education  11.24 3.29  11.64 2.76 
  Missing mother’s education  .02 .16 .00 .04 
  Father’s education  10.84 4.66  11.58 4.08 
  Missing father’s education  .08 .27 .03 .17 
  Intact family when respondent was 14  .75 .43 .79 .41 
  Parental family income in 1978 ($1,000)  14.28 13.41 15.79 14.46 
  Missing parental family income  .18 .39 .21 .41 
  Parents received AFDC in 1978  .09 .28 .10 .30 
  Missing AFDC receipt  .01 .11 .01 .10 
  Number of children  3.91 2.51 4.51 2.40 
  Missing number of children  .11 .31 .07 .26 
Individual Characteristics      
  Black  .14 .35 .16 .37 
  Age  23.89 3.07  23.50 2.95 
  AFQT  53.90 30.15 55.75 31.09 
  Missing AFQT  .05 .22 .04 .19 
  Locus of control  2.86 .62  2.85 .58 
  Self-esteem  3.16 .66  3.17 .61 
  Missing psychological state  .03 .16 .02 .14 
Contextual Conditions      
  Black proportion of resident county  .01 .01 .01 .01 
  Poverty proportion of resident county  .01 .01 .01 .01 
  Living in central city  .15 .35 .16 .36 
  Poverty×Central city  1.74 4.57 1.88 4.76 
  State AFDC benefit level ($1,000)  .45 .18 .46 .18 
  Missing AFDC level  .00 .00 .00 .00 
  County manufacturing employment growth rate   -.00 .05  -.00 .05 
  Missing employment growth rate  .01 .08 .00 .06 
Number of families  4,885    755   
Number of individuals  5,803    1,652   
Number of observations  48,387    13,618   
Note: Sampling weights were used to reproduce the population distribution of means and standard deviations. 
 